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 Ethnic Cleansing: Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan

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In the Refugee Camps

According latest UNHCR figures, 84,245 people are registered in the rows of small huts in the  eight camps in Jhapa and Morang districts of southeastern Nepal.  There are actually five sites, with the largest being divided administratively and considered separate camps.  The largest grouping is found in the three Beldangi camps with 42,670 people, a population approached by only one town in the district.[122] Camps are run by UNHCR Project Monitoring Officers, government of Nepal Camp Managers, and a small group of Nepali police.  Much of the day-to-day operations and record keeping falls to the semi-elected Camp Management Committees.  UNHCR's major implementing partners are Save the Children Fund (SCF-UK) for health and Lutheran World Service (LWS) for most other aspects such as food and housing.  

Camp residents are provided bamboo and sheet plastic to build their own huts.  Refugees are supplied rations of rice, lentils, vegetables and kerosene for cooking.  Some of the camps, such as the Beldangi camps, have a planned appearance, with long rows of huts and latrines.  Others, such as Sanischare and Timai, are more scattered, revealing themselves as the earliest camps, established more as a squatters settlements than as organized camps.  Maidhar, the earliest camp, built on the floodplain of a river and subjected to severe flooding during the monsoons, has been closed and the residents relocated to other camps.  In some areas locals have capitalized on the presence of the refugees by establishing rows of small stores just outside the camps to cater to the basic needs of the refugees which are not met by the camps such as soap, tea, milk, etc.  

Each of the camps have schools now, though they are crowded and run on several shifts with few supplies.  Attendance at the schools is excellent, as there is little else for children to do.  Health services are better than in the average Nepali village.  An SCF-UK worker reported a recent survey of children in Beldangi identified only 1.9% as malnourished.  There are still complaints that the food is not enough, or the kerosene provided for stoves does not last the month, or especially that the plastic sheets provided for roofing rip easily and leak.  The camps are far from luxurious, with small huts housing large extended families.  But in general, the struggle for basic survival faced in the last few years is over.  Now the challenge of physical survival takes a back seat to the challenge of maintaining a semblance of society despite the breakdown of normal circumstances.  

As the likelihood of a long stay dawns on refugees, the prospect of empty days weighs heavily.  This idle population has proven a fertile breeding ground for political organizations adding to tension in the camps.  There is a small income generation program organized by Oxfam which teaches women to knit and provides materials and small incentives for finished products.  Such programs are badly needed for a wider segment of the population, especially for youths who are no longer in school.

  Relations with Local Communities

With the refugee camps forming some of the largest concentrations of people in eastern Nepal, interactions between the local population and the refugees are unavoidable.[123] Relations range from excellent at Goldhap Camp to strained and angry around Sanischare Camp.  Conversations with people of the surrounding communities inevitably include complaints about refugees leaving the camps to find work outside, often for low wages which undercut the daily wage demands of the locals.  

A common practice of refugees leaving the camps to work is giving their ration cards to those who stay behind.  This means there are surpluses of some of the staples provided by UNHCR which find their way onto the local market, depressing prices.  UNHCR has instituted spot checks to identify missing persons and pull ration cards of those not in the camps.  Prices of those items not provided by UNHCR, such as milk or eggs, are not immune from influence and have greatly increased due to demand from refugees.  Locals also report that house rents have increased astronomically due to the influx of aid agencies and their workers.  On the other hand, quite a few individuals have profited from the boom in contracts for construction, building materials, and other supplies.  

Social effects also are acutely felt.  Locals complain of increased theft, prostitution and robbery.  Some of these are due to the refugees, but other incidents are readily blamed on the refugees who provide a convenient scapegoat for local social problems.  The Sanischare Camp, which is located closest to a Nepali bazaar town predictably has the most friction between refugees and locals.  

Lutheran World Service is hoping to coordinate a series of projects sponsored by a variety of donors to develop projects to offset or mitigate the impacts of the refugees on the local population.  Suggestions from the local communities range from building schools to water projects to roads.  Some communities already have benefitted indirectly, such as Goldhap village which would have waited a long time for a road if not for the presence of a refugee camp.  

As screening increases the number of people who are refused assistance in the camps, local relations may see more strain.  Those refused assistance are still free to enter Nepal and they likely will stick close to their relatives in the camps.  This population is technically not allowed to spend the night in the camps, so they may attempt to squat on local or government land as the original flows of refugees did.  This presence, adding to the population of homeless Nepali nationals such as the 4,000 households squatting near Timai camp would surely become a factor in local politics.

  Organizations in Exile

The proliferation of human rights groups and political parties among the refugees has created more rivalry than cooperation, yet it is increasingly important as it is also increasingly confusing.  A full account of the various parties and human rights groups is beyond the scope of this paper but some understanding of the situation is important.  The groups play an influential role in the camps and rivalries among groups are as likely to upset a smooth solution as is the reluctance of the government of Bhutan.  

The refugee situation has spawned human rights and political activists of a variety of agendas and missions.  The animosity between some of the groups leads not only to inefficiency in supplying relief, but also to discord and violence in the fragile society established in the camps.  There are already conflicts concerning who speaks for the refugees, and what the voice of the refugees should say.  As the governments of Nepal and Bhutan meet to discuss the future of the refugees, there surely will be different reactions to any proposals emanating from the talks.  

As noted above, Tek Nath Rizal and a small group of dissidents formed the Peoples Forum for Human Rights (PFHR) in July, 1989.  The Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP) was formed in June, 1990 and, along with PFHR and the Students Union of Bhutan (SUB) organized the mass rallies beginning September, 1990.  In September, 1991 the leadership of PFHR voted to change its name to the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan (HUROB) and distance itself from its former links with the BPP, its youth wing, the Youth Organization of Bhutan (YOB), and politics in general.  In the process they thought to dissolve PFHR, yet PFHR was soon revived by a handful of members and an infusion of personnel from the BPP leadership.  Shortly thereafter, the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP) was formed by persons with close ties to HUROB.  HUROB has tried hard to distance itself from the BNDP, but rightly or wrongly is often associated with the party.  The Association of Human Rights Activists (AHURA) was formed next by later arriving refugees who saw the other human rights groups as too closely tied to political parties.  A third political party, the Bhutan Congress Party (BCP), was recently formed in May, 1993 by a handful of defecting BPP members, but it has yet to do much more than announce its existence.  The array is confusing not just to outsiders, but also to many of the refugees who are simple farmers with no experience or interest in active participatory politics.  

The original PFHR was initially responsible for much of the camp management and HUROB assumed these duties after it split from the BPP.  The split left HUROB with a considerable role in camp management which was resented by the BPP, which works hard to promote an active image in the camps.  In explaining the decision to split, HUROB founders cite the need to distance themselves from politics and policies of the BPP which they did not feel were strong enough in renouncing violence.  The BPP is clearly the group most often linked to violence by the government of Bhutan.  Claiming non-violent principles, the BPP has been somewhat slow to disassociate itself from charges of violence within Bhutan.  According to some, the failure to make strong denials is in order to enhance their image as a party which is active in Bhutan.  

Different visions of membership provide perhaps the greatest distinction between the operating styles of the groups.  For example, the BPP envisions itself as a populist movement and touts its history of concrete action in Bhutan.  A recent project was the dissemination of a publication on the refugee situation in the Dzongkha language in Bhutan.  The BPP is the most active recruiter of members in the camps and much of the political activism in the camps initiates with it.  HUROB and BNDP, in contrast, do not see themselves as membership organizations, but as a rather small cadres of former government officials and professionals.  HUROB's approach has been one of documenting violations in Bhutan and actively lobbying on the international front, declaring that it will work first for return through avenues such as internationalization of the issue, then the time for politics will come and the parties can take over.  As a later arrival on the scene, AHURA also has a small membership and has made independence and political non-affiliation guiding principles.  Issues of personality, background and class also play a role with groups like HUROB, BNDP and AHURA composed primarily of former high level civil servants, in contrast to the broader membership sought by the BPP and its affiliate PFHR.

The leaders of the various groups and parties frequently criticize each other on both policy and personal issues.  For instance, accusing the BNDP of "sit and wait" policies aimed at a return to the old status quo in Bhutan, the BPP stays in the limelight through frequent media contact and a strong presence in the camps.  Other groups respond that contrived media attention is counterproductive when planned events like the BPP's long awaited satyagraha (peaceful non-cooperation protest) in Bhutan are repeatedly announced but not implemented.[124] On more personal levels, leaders of the groups trade rumors about each other and recent reports from the camps indicate that one group has just initiated a signature campaign against leaders of a rival group.  Leaders accuse each other with charges such as involvement in incidents in the camps, not having a strong claim to Bhutanese citizenship, or being more interested in personal advancement than in helping refugees.  Such infighting among refugees damages the credibility of all the groups and obscures the fact that they share many common goals.  

The rivalry between groups is not just a game played among intellectual exiles, and it has serious consequences for the prospects of peace in the camps and peaceful resolution of the refugee problem.  In the past year, two murders in the camps were linked to political activism and there are numerous incidents of threats and intimidation towards other refugees and aid personnel.  The government of Nepal and UNHCR have moved to reduce political activities in the camps and has increased the presence of police in the camps.  A unified front, or at least constructive and peaceful working relationship among the groups, is important not just for the sake of a secure atmosphere in the camps.  If the talks between Bhutan and Nepal lead towards a solution at some point in the future, contradictory reactions by the various groups to any proposals are likely to increase tensions in the camps and may compromise efforts to secure a return to Bhutan.  

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