Bhutan: An Introduction

The disparity between Bhutan's recently downsized total population estimate of 600,000 and the more precise yet presumably less accurate 1990 figure of 1,461,853 demonstrates the level of speculation which creeps into any discussion of demographics in Bhutan.[1] Yet demographic forces and fears lie near the heart of events in Bhutan. Refugees make demographic arguments to support their longstanding roots in Bhutan and their legal claims to Bhutanese citizenship. The government of Bhutan counters with allegations of illegal immigration which threatens Bhutan's "survival as a distinct political and cultural entity" and "impose[s] a state of demographic siege on Bhutan."[2] The open borders between Bhutan and India, and India and Nepal, historically have created easy movements of people and difficult determinations of nationality throughout the region.

The demographic battle has two primary fronts. First, within Bhutan the government argues that many of the ethnic Nepalis or their ancestors in Bhutan arrived after 1961 to work on development projects and do not meet the 1958 cutoff for citizenship established by Bhutan's 1985 Nationality Law. Second, outside Bhutan the government justifies the need for the current immigration crackdown citing "the relentless tide of the Nepali diaspora"[3] waiting for an opportune moment to invade Bhutan. At times this anticipated invasion is portrayed as the demographic pressure of people seeking better living conditions, but often it is described as a plot for the establishment of a "Greater Nepal" or a Nepali dominated Bhutan.

Under any interpretation, the southern Bhutanese population is a major part of the demographic equation of Bhutan. Bhutanese Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering stated that one-third [4] of the country's population is of Nepalese origin while some refugee groups claim figures as high as 53%.[5] The government of Bhutan has not released any census data, and other potential indicators, such as the civil service composition of 39% southern Bhutanese in 1990,[6] perhaps suggest that the true figure is somewhere in between. Estimates of the Ngalong population display similarly divergent ranges, from refugee estimates of 16%[7] to an official figure of 28%.[8]

In supporting their positions, both sides have resorted to historical arguments concerning the early presence of ethnic Nepalis in Bhutan. Refugees place "the first batch of Nepali settlers... as far back as 1624 A.D."[9] while the government "state[s] emphatically that no Nepalese ever crossed beyond the Teesta River until after 1865, let alone penetrate [sic] into Bhutan."[10] The resolution of this historical argument has little relevance to the average resident of the camps in Nepal. The issue of early Nepali settlement is important, however, in analyzing the current population. Few dispute that in, or around, 1898 the Dorji family was granted permission to settle immigrants in southern Bhutan and in 1932 a British army officer reported 60,000 Nepali-speaking inhabitants in south west Bhutan.[11] Nepalis came legally as laborers to clear forests in Samchi and the cleared - land was parcelled off to workers.[12] According to the government, only in the early 1950s did settlement spread from southwestern Samchi and Chirang to the Sarbhang, Geylegphug and Samdrupjhongkhar areas, and in 1958 the National Assembly passed its first Nationality Act, granting citizenship to these settlers.[13]

Most southern Bhutanese in the refugee camps claim to have settled before 1958 or trace their ancestry to those early settlers to derive claims to citizenship. The government charges that many of the southern Bhutanese came after the first five-year development plan in 1961 when:

... faced by a shortage of manpower to construct roads and implement development programmes, the government employed baidars (labour contractors) to import tens of thousands of labourers from Nepal. Almost three decades passed before the Royal Government became aware of the presence of illegal immigrants. By then substantial numbers of them had already mingled and merged with the local population in southern Nepal.[14]

According to the government, "..this influx was a case of outright illegal immigration over a porous and open border" and was "undetected by the government until the census carried out in 1988."[15]

Whether invited as potential future citizens simply as migrant laborers, ethnic Nepalis clearly were actively recruited and welcomed to Bhutan. The government's claim of thirty years of ignorance concerning their presence must be met with skepticism. Many of the workers were granted land[16] and the 1958 Nationality Act allowed for the naturalization of landowners after ten years of residence. The issue of integrating the growing southern population frequently was discussed in the National Assembly, such as the 51st Session of the National Assembly in 1979 where debates included the appropriateness of using the Nepali language in the Assembly, southern Bhutanese attitudes towards driglam namzha and national dress, incentives for intermarriages between ethnic Nepalis and Drukpas, and the issuance of identification cards to Bhutanese citizens.[17] Additionally, citizenship and marriage laws were debated repeatedly long before they were revised in 1977, 1980 and 1985 and a national census was conducted in 1981 followed by the issuance of citizenship cards. The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs reported to the National Assembly that "according to an assessment in September, 1987 there was [sic] over one lakh [ 1 00,000] non-nationals in the country."[18]

The picture is not one of a sudden realization, thirty years after the fact, that Bhutan was inhabited by a large number of illegal ethnic Nepalis, but rather a scenario of escalating concern over the failure to integrate this portion of the population into the politically dominant Drukpa culture. Writing in 1977, Leo Rose noted that the Bhutanese government "populated the area of Bhutan most susceptible to rapid economic development and to ideological penetration from India with a community that had not been integrated, either socially or politically, into the broader Bhutanese society."[19] The progression of citizenship laws, the policies on driglam namzha and language, and especially the events since 1988 reflect a growing assimilationist, and failing that exclusionist, mood.

While minimizing estimates of the ethnic Nepalis legally settled in southern Bhutan, the government repeatedly raises the spectre of "another 10 million Nepalis living in India, many of them across Bhutan's immediate southern border... look[ing] towards Bhutan as an economic haven."[20] The 1981 census of India reports 1,252,444 speakers of Nepali, although this did not include Assam, which had 353,673 Nepali speakers in 1971.[21]

While conceding this census figure may be low and a decade behind, it seems an estimate of ten million is clearly exaggerated, and certainly not all of these are looking towards Bhutan. Even crusaders for the inclusion of the Nepali language as an official language of India held their likely inflated projections to five or six million[22], including Nepalis settled in distant central, west and south India. Still, whatever estimate is reasonable, the Nepali population in India is substantial compared to that of relatively under populated Bhutan, and the fears expressed by Bhutan merit consideration.

The least credible of the fears Bhutan expresses is that of a "Greater Nepal" or "Pan Nepal" stretching across the Himalayas which Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering identified as a "motivating factor" of immigration to Bhutan.[23] Under this theory, unnamed forces seek to unify the entire Himalayan region into one state with a dominant Nepali culture. The conflicting politics of the region make the likelihood of a unifying force seeking to exploit a consciously guided, politically motivated migration highly unlikely.[24]

Comparisons with Sikkim are more apt and an Indian Adviser to Bhutan's King in the 1960s later wrote that the "Bhutanese have seen how, in neighbouring Sikkim, the original inhabitants have been gradually outnumbered by Nepalese immigrants, and are determined to stop the process in their own country before it assumes unmanageable proportions."[25] The government of Bhutan echoes this thought, stating that "the southern Bhutan problem is neither a movement for democracy nor an issue concerning human rights. It is simply an attempt by an ethnic community to turn themselves into a majority through illegal immigration in order to take over political power."[26] Crediting to this assertion raises problems similar to that of the "Greater Nepal" concept in terms of identifying leadership with the ability to influence and exploit long term patterns of migration. Further, while democratic reforms in Bhutan would likely lead to a weakening of consolidated Drukpa power, the timing of events indicates that the human rights activism and politicization of the southern Bhutanese were more a reaction to increasing pressure to assimilate than a proactive power grab.

Yet to argue that generations of migration were not politically orchestrated is not to argue that demographic forces do not pose a serious threat to the traditional society of northern Bhutan. The Bhutanese:

"saw Sikkim lose its sovereignty and become a Nepali dominated state in India 17 years ago, watched apprehensively as Darjeeling erupted into anarchy and violence in a Nepali-led struggle for political autonomy during the late 1980s, and can hardly have been unaware of the Democracy Movement which reduced the status of Nepal's King Birendra to that of a constitutional monarch in 1990 ... "[27]

Leaving aside the perceived spectre of ten million Nepalis waiting at the border, with the growing internal Nepali population it is understandable that the Drukpa elite of Bhutan to feel some trepidation for their continued privileged position.

Numbers alone, however, can give a misleading impression of pressures on the various cultures of Bhutan since "[s]ettlement by Nepali Bhutanese in areas outside of southern Bhutan, while not specifically forbidden, in fact is still effectively discouraged."[28] Each of the three main ethnic groups of Bhutan live in geographically separate areas and maintain distinct cultural patterns, and recent attempts at integration have been largely ineffective. The rare visitor to southern Bhutan would certainly not get a strong taste of Drukpa culture, and most visitors to Bhutan, who are restricted to the north, remain unaware even of the existence of a distinct culture in southern Bhutan.

Perhaps because of this geographic separation, and the fact that southern Bhutanese for the most part settled in previously uninhabited areas, the relations between the ethnic groups have been uncharacteristically positive on a subcontinent tom by communal conflicts. The flight of refugees is integrally linked to ethnicity, yet not charged with racial animosity. The issue is more of cultural assimilation than ethnic extermination. Bhutan is not an Asian Yugoslavia or Somalia where popular ethnic conflict bubbles openly to the surface. Policy decisions which have resulted in the present situation are largely centralized, and there is room for reconciliation between the peoples of Bhutan. Unfortunately, as time goes by, positions harden in reaction to propaganda and opportunities for negotiation may fade.