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A
Committee for Categorization
The
journey down the slow road of quiet diplomacy reached a milestone on July 18,
1993 when
the
governments of Bhutan and Nepal announced the intention to form a joint
committee to seek a "speedy and durable solution to the problem of the
people in the refugee camps in eastern Nepal." [125]
The committee
will be at the ministerial level and be composed of three people from each
government. The official task that
so far has been announced for the committee is to "determine the different
categories of the people claiming to have come from Bhutan in the refugee camps
of eastern Nepal."[126] This committee is
strictly bilateral with no role as yet envisioned for India or UNHCR.
The
Joint Secretary of the Home Ministry of Nepal describes this categorization as a
simple prospect, stating, "Those who are Bhutanese citizens go back to
Bhutan, those who are Indian citizens go to India, and those who are Nepalese
citizens stay in Nepal."[127] Factual determinations
aside, it is doubtful that establishing categories will be so
straightforward. The government of
Bhutan has often discussed the various categories of people in the camps, and a
recent list included: "illegal Nepali residents in Bhutan; imported Nepali
labourers who were claiming to be Bhutanese nationals by virtue of having worked
in Bhutan; dissidents, many of whom had committed criminal and terrorist
offences in Bhutan; Bhutanese nationals who had emigrated legally after
renouncing their citizenship and selling all their properties; and people from
other parts of the region including Nepal itself,
who had never even set foot in Bhutan." [128]
In an earlier listing in Kuensel, another
category was included, that of "Bhutanese nationals who had left of their
own free will in response to the inducements offered by the dissident groups in
Nepal."[129]
Bhutan tacitly acknowledges the presence of genuine refugees, agreeing it
"would accept full responsibility for all bona fide Bhutanese nationals who had
been forcibly evicted from Bhutan."[130]
Elaboration
on this last category of "bona fide Bhutanese refugees" also could
easily include subcategories such as: those forced to sign "voluntary"
agreements before leaving; those accused of anti-national activities; those who
lost nationality because a relative was accused of anti-national activities;
those who served terms in prison over a year in length; those who fled before
facing the census; those who lost citizenship through retroactive application of
citizenship laws, etc. Given that
Bhutan denies the existence of cases such as would fall into these categories,
factual issues will be a major stumbling block for resolution of many cases.
Setting up a modality for sorting the refugees is a daunting task and the
prospect of individual adjudication of claims to Bhutanese citizenship, each
complete with problems of verification, is over-whelming.
Any individualized process would be incredibly slow.
To even attempt such a process without active assistance from UNHCR would
be evidence of the lack of any intention to succeed.
Even
if categorization is accomplished, it may be no more than a ploy to delay for
years while commitments concerning return for those in various categories are
unclear. For example, if a category
for "dissidents" is established as Bhutan suggests, what is to be
their fate? Under existing
Bhutanese law, a genuine Bhutanese national can lose citizenship for
anti-national activities, but this does not make that person a citizen of either
Nepal or India. Bhutan is certainly
not eager to accept the return of dissidents, and without some guarantees of
safety many dissidents are not eager to return.
Roadblocks
to Resolution
The
Home Ministry of Nepal firmly states that "it is not up to the refugees to
choose their repatriation procedure. It
is up to His Majesty's Government of Nepal." Refugees are sincerely
grateful to Nepal for the humanitarian response of the country in providing
relief, but they now resent being shut out of the process of negotiating for
their futures. The faltering
progress of the Nepalese government's quiet diplomacy leaves the refugees with
understandably little confidence in Nepal as a negotiator for their futures.
This is especially true as Nepal's Home Ministry has been the active
player, and it is more than busy dealing with the aftermath of the massive
floods and landslides which recently ravaged Nepal.
The ongoing communist-led demonstrations and general strikes provide
further distractions as the Nepali Congress government fights for its continued
existence with a slim majority in the parliament.
Also, the growing tensions between refugees and locals provide incentives
for the government which may not match those of the refugees.
Unfortunately,
though the bilateral committee may be a positive step, real solutions appear a
distant hope. Even if some
categorization and sorting processes are achieved, numerous issues must be
addressed before any thought of repatriation is possible.
These are not issues that have simple answers, and resolution of these
issues, and the refugee problem, will be slow in coming. Still,
the problems of future should be factored into any talks at an early stage.
If not, the talks become a charade and yet another excuse for delay.
Below is just a sampling of the issues to be resolved.
For
starters, although refugee groups and parties call for the return of all those
in the camps, few observers believe that Bhutan
will agree to the return of more than a fraction of those
in the camps.
Any future proposals for partial return are sure to be opposed by
the refugees and create further divisions among the refugee groups. Another
baseline issue for the refugees that has yet to be addressed is the guarantee of
human rights upon return. Without
international monitoring of some sort, many refugees will not feel safe
returning to the country where they suffered abuse.
While there are still reports of ongoing abuse and political prisoners
such as Tek Nath Rizal still are detained in Bhutan, constructive dialogue on
this point is difficult. With
Nepal's less than stellar human rights record, the refugees might wish for a
different negotiator if the talks ever reach the topic of human rights
guarantees in Bhutan.
Refugee
demands for democratic reforms are sure to create havoc.
Bhutan has shown no willingness to even consider reforms.
Some groups see minimal reform as a future issue after return, while
others demand a major overhaul as a prerequisite to return.
The reconciliation of democratic reforms with Bhutan's concerns for
cultural preservation will create immense complications, and consensus will not
be achieved easily.
Refugees
want to return to the land they abandoned, but fear that Bhutan will try to
scatter them throughout the north. Even
if Bhutan does not resettle the southern lands and allows return there, issues
of compensation paid to those fleeing will arise.
If any of those in the camps are unable to return, issues of assistance
settling in Nepal or India may complicate resettlement.
Recent reports from Bhutan indicate that the government has initiated a
signature campaign in southern Bhutan calling for those who left to not be
allowed back. The pressures a
southern Bhutanese may feel when presented with such a petition are enormous,
but the very existence of such documents will complicate return.
Compensation
issues also arise in the context of accountability for those who committed human
rights violations. Bhutan has yet
to admit violations, and is not likely to do so.
Yet reconciliation without some acknowledgement or accountability will
leave unresolved tensions. Other
issues include the fate of refugees not in camps, extradition of some refugee
leaders sought by Bhutan, accountability versus impunity for human rights
violators, etc.
Motivations
for Compromise
The
issues discussed above are important to keep in mind, but any talk of resolving
them would be premature, since solutions are not around the comer.
Any movement towards a solution of the refugee situation will require
compromise on all sides. As yet,
there is little indication that the government of Bhutan is ready to soften its
stance on recognizing the claims of nationality by refugees in Nepal, despite
pressure from many angles. Sources
of pressure on Bhutan include growing international media attention, concerns of
international donors and withdrawal of aid, the diplomatic talks with Nepal,
activism by the refugees both inside and outside Bhutan, and India.
Of
these sources of pressure, most agree that India is the key to any solution,
although its role might not be very open. As
the regional superpower, and the country which landlocks both Bhutan and Nepal,
India has tremendous influence in the area.
Nepal was reminded of this during its 1989-90 trade and transit dispute
with India. Bhutan is equally
vulnerable, receiving 70% of its foreign aid from India.
Bhutan is further bound by a 1949 treaty to be "guided by the advice
of the Government of India in regard to its external relations."[131]
Since all the refugees in Nepal got there by crossing
through about 100 kilometers of India, and would return the same way, any
solution without Indian approval is unlikely. Also, a common claim of Bhutan is that many of those in the
camps are really from India, again leaving a solution in India's absence
impractical. As yet, India has not
adopted positions openly or made clear use of its influence to promote a
solution.
In
spite of the lack of public statements on its position, many believe India is
active behind the scenes. Some
attribute the entire problem to a conscious policy set in motion by India, perhaps seeking to destabilize either Nepal or Bhutan or
both. Others see the hand of India
in Bhutan's changed stance on talks with Nepal or in Nepal's sudden reversal of
its decision to internationalize the issue.
Still others deny an active Indian role, attributing India's inaction to
its comfortable dealings with the Thimphu regime on issues such as the sale of
cheap hydropower. The level of
India's activity to date is unclear. What
is clear is the need for India to become active, openly or behind the scenes,
since this is the most realistic route to creating the kind of pressure needed
to bring about a settlement. In the
meantime, continued attention and publicity on the international front is needed
to keep pressure on Bhutan and prompt India into positive action.
International donor agencies are uniquely positioned to apply pressure on
Bhutan.
Looking
Ahead
The
issues outlined above will not be resolved easily and the prospects for quick
solutions are dim. For refugees in
Nepal this means the challenge of living in exile and struggling to hold
together their families and society under trying circumstances.
For southern Bhutanese in Bhutan this means continued insecurity and
exposure to the threats of violence and deportation.
For all there is the continuing fight to have the government of Bhutan
recognize legitimate claims to nationality and legitimate claims to live according
to one's own culture.
The
contrast between the image of Bhutan as shangri-la
and the reality of southern Bhutan is hard for many to accept.
Yet Bhutan has a long history of strong action to protect its borders
from perceived threats of invasion. The
fierce passion of the northern Bhutanese in protecting their culture is not in itself the problem. It is the
manifestation of this cultural protection in the denial of the human rights of
the southern Bhutanese that must be condemned.
The government of Bhutan cannot make the simple equation that advocating
for the rights of the southern Bhutanese is the same as advocating for the
extinction of the Drukpa culture. Hope
for the future lies in the belief that in Bhutan there is room for both the
northern and southern cultures. Diversity
is not a luxury reserved for large countries and can be an aspect of Bhutan's
distinct national culture.
End
of the document
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