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A NATION IN TRANSITION
MISSION TO BHUTAN : Nation in Transition
B.S.Das, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi,
1995 (128pp)
As the first resident
representative of India in Bhutan, Das was witness to many events which are
significant in terms of modem Bhutanese history. Over the course of his
four-years stay in the Kingdom (January 1968 - March 1972), the author himself
contributed much to the process of Bhutanese efforts to deal with the changing
situation as the country strove to project itself as a modern nation. The main
part of the book deals with this transitional Period, and the author candidly
discusses personalities, events and developments of the time in a very
personalized, readable fashion. But it is the terse second half of the book,
Part H - Post 1971 Bhutan (pages 109-128), which is the subject of review. The
author himself is unlikely to criticize this decision since it is here that he
has chosen to locate the moral of his story.
"Part II of this book is a
reflection of my views on the current scenario highlighting Bhutan's problems in
the coming years. I am not a futurologist and, therefore, may be wrong in my
assessment. I very much hope so for Bhutan's sake." This ominous conclusion
by Das in his preface sums up the concerns of an author whose love for the
country and deep respect for the, late King is mirrored throughout the book.
The single biggest threat to
internal stability in Bhutan, Das believes, has emerged as a consequence of the
transformation of the sociopolitical institutions in the country over the past
two decades In this short span of time, new Power equations have developed while
established institutions have lost their authority to provide direction and
exercise control. A new class of people and a new breed of policy makers have
emerged. The "arrogant, westernized, and inexperienced" bureaucracy
which wrested power, although trying to accommodate traditional systems, failed
in its attempts to evolve "anew concept of Bhutanese nationalism." The
National Assembly and the Royal Advisory Council were made impotent and
"have not emerged as part of a modern political system or institutions
representing the will of the people except as a sounding board" while
"the monastic order exists only in name." According to Das,
"today, Bhutan has unquestioned leadership in the person of the King but
nothing beyond except plenty of money through aid."
The large volume of aid that has
been poured into the Kingdom "Rs 40,000 million [Seventh Five Year Plan]
for a population officially listed as 600,000" - ("No wonder,
Bhutan claims to have the highest per capita income in South Asia," Das
writes) has brought about consequent changes in the social structure with the
wide gap between 'haves' and 'have nots' creating points of conflict. "In
the absence of any political parties or non-governmental institutions," the
enormous wealth of the recently created middle class is resulting in "centres
of power (are) emerging within the bureaucracy that wield clout detrimental to
the country's interests." Except for the personal direction of the King who
alone can intervene, "there are no checks and balances" or
"in-built safety valves in the institutional system. " As Bhutan
struggles to adjust and fit into the new world order of the 21st century, the
advantage of "controllability" afforded "by a one-man
institutional set up" will become "flash points in the coming
years," Das writes. In fact, Das believes that the current crisis in the
Kingdom is only a manifestation of this larger problem afflicting the nation.
Devoting a separate chapter to
this " ethnic dilemma", Das points out in the very beginning that
"the ethnic issues are far deeper in their origins" than mere
semantics about dates of migrant settlements or in terms of indigenous people
and migrants. "The problem is not difficult to solve," he writes,
provided one sees "the entire ethnic problem of Bhutan in a correct
Perspective. "
Bhutan, according to Das, failed
to appreciate or understand it, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious
personality. While conscious of the demographic threat, Bhutanese rulers ignored
the complexities of a mixed Population in the south and believed that
"placing restrictions on citizenship rights and movement of Nepalese
settlers" limited the problem. Rumblings regarding discrimination had
started in the late King's time as "representation in the National Assembly
and services was limited" for southern Bhutanese whose movement was
"confined upto a line which clearly demarcated the ethnic zones."
The merger of Sikkim with India
in 1975 and the agitation in the Darjeeling hills are seen as developments which
heightened the insecurity of the regime, leading to the "missjudgment of
the Bhutan Government" beginning with a census to identify migrants and the
over enthusiastic implementation of "their ideas on the new concept of
Bhutanese nationalism." The bureaucracy and Police resorted to
"strong-arm methods" and "excess were committed" while
implementing the new directives. These led to a situation where "even the
bonafide Nepalese-Bhutanese settled for over a century felt threatened,"
and in the end, "a political and economic problem mishandled became a major
ethnic issue leading to bitter accusations."
The author believes that
"basic issues were lost sight of" because the ethnic problem really
has its roots in perceived inequities. He blames the leadership among southern
Bhutanese for failing to remedy the problems through direct dialogue with the
King, and apportions equal blame to the monarch, "a liberal in his own way,
yet highly susceptible to a misplaced concept of Bhutanese nationalism, (who)
was misguided by his immediate advisors who did not comprehend the situation
correctly." Consequently, Das says, "the leadership of Nepalese
Bhutanese was taken over by outsiders who very cleverly manipulated the solvable
issues to intractable demands," while the King "was left in an unhappy
situation where he had nobody who could retrieve the situation tactfully."
Both dissidents as well as the government will
question some of the author's observations, but they will find little fault with
his basic prescription for a solution. "The solution to ethnic problem lies
not in contesting numbers," he writes, "but taking concrete steps in
identifying genuine subjects, giving an equitable share and opportunity in all
spheres of the country's governance. Most of all, Bhutan should not even
remotely force an integrated culture in such a multi-ethnic society as it has.
At the same time it should never permit any section to question or destroy the
Drukpa entity of the country."
Prescriptions may be simple, but for medication
to take effect it must first be consumed or applied. When the patient is
unwilling, this is difficult. Toeing the Indian government line, the author does
not propose intervention by the doctor. While maintaining that " any
instability in Bhutan affects India directly " and cautioning that "a
lingering sore like this can become cancerous", he weakly argues that
"India does not wish to destabilize either Bhutan or Nepal." The
implicit threat that immediately follows makes an even greater mockery of this
Indian restraint: "This does not make India a distant observer. Its
interests at a given time will decide the degree and time of an intervention.
Sikkim is an example."
Das, the Chief Executive in
Sikkim during the crucial period when the former Himalayan Kingdom merged with
India, says "it was the discrimination economic disparity created by a
feudal system for self-preservation that led to the agitation," and
drives home the significant point that "it was not the 75 per cent
Nepalese population of Sikkim that led to the ruling pattern." He is
sympathetic to Bhutanese fears of demographic changes but advises Bhutan to take
lessons from Sikkim's history where also the Chogyal attempted to enforce
"a misconceived concept of Sikkimese nationalism" but could not change
the deep cultural roots of his multi-ethnic groups into a blend of "loose
knit pseudo-nationalism."
The central therne running
through the author's discussion of the current situation in Bhutan is that the
regime has ironically weakened its position in the efforts to strengthen itself
to protect its vested interests. Traditional institutions have been sidelined by
an efficient bureaucracy, but "the King and the elite bureaucracy cannot
constitute a system." Having devalued the traditional systems which
integrated the country, Bhutan, now "neither a Shangrila as commonly known
to the outside world, nor a modern society am understood in terms of values and
systems, (it) seems to be struggling to discover in itself the new concept of
nationalism with one leader, one language, one nation." The Kingdom faces
"a confused future", the author states, as the present cannot even be
termed a transitional phase "because there are no clearly defined lasting
objectives towards which the system is moving."
Unless the "many gaps in its
political, economic, and social content" are filled up, they could pose a
serious threat to the nation's integrity and stability in the coming decade,
according to Das. The "ethnic" crisis and the consequent problem of
refugees is only one visible manifestation of trouble brewing in the Himalayan
Kingdom. Is the leadership capable of handling the " possible dangers
within?"
According to Das, "he (the
King) has to give a clear direction to his people." He adds, "the
Chogyal of Sikkim relied too much on the advice of people who did not understand
the basics of geopolitics. His own support party of Bhutias ultimately caused
his downfall as he ultimately realized and shared this feeling with me. The
foreigners on whom he depended never came to his rescue. None of his Nepalese
subjects contributed to any of this. in fact, I can say it with confidence that
Sikkim's Nepalese subjects regretted the Chogyal's departure the most.,, The
book is an invaluable addition to the limited literature available on Bhutan.
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