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The Search for Political Solution
The governments of Bhutan and Nepal agreed to establish a Ministerial Joint
Committee to work towards a resolution of the refugee problem in July 1993. At
its first meeting in Kathmandu in October 1993, the Committee agreed
to verify the status of the people in the camps and agreed on four categories:
1. bonafide Bhutanese if they have been evicted forcibly;
2. Bhutanese who emigrated;
3. non-Bhutanese people;
4. Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts.
(Joint Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, 7 October
1993).
Since then, six rounds of talks have not produced further
tangible results and the Nepalese media have criticized their government for
agreeing to these four categories. The negotiations have not been helped by two
changes of government in Nepal since they began. Whenever the delegations met in
1994 and 1995, it seems that the Nepalese team usually pressed to move on to the
verification process, and that the Bhutanese team insisted that the two sides
should 'harmonize their positions' on each category first. This delayed
progress, because the latter objective was very difficult to achieve without one
side or the other making concessions. If the Bhutanese were allowed to apply
their national laws, the Nepalese feared that huge numbers of people would fall
into category 2 (unless it could be proved that emigration forms were signed
under duress), category 4 (for having demonstrated against government policies),
or category 3 (simply for leaving the country and thereby forfeiting their
citizenship). As Thronson argues,
under these [Bhutanese citizenship] laws, dissidents
accused of anti-national activity can be stripped of citizenship, but that
certainly does not obligate other states to grant citizenship. Similarly, if
the 1958 clause stripping citizenship from all those who abandon agricultural
land is literally applied, without consideration of the myriad reasons the
southern Bhutanese had to flee, every resident of the camps can be 'legally'
declared a non-national (Thronson 1993:8).
The sample survey of 883 camp households conducted by the
Nepalese government in February 1995 placed 879 of the households in category 1,
but also stated that 406 households (45.98 per cent of the sample) had signed
voluntary migration forms, and all but 34 had received compensation. The
Nepalese argued that 'international principles' should be applied to this
process, and some urged that a third party should be involved in the
negotiations. The Bhutanese government made it clear that it would not agree to
UNHCR playing such a role (a stance criticized by Thronson, who argues that
"to
even attempt such a process without active assistance from UNHCR would be
evidence of the lack of any intention to succeed" (1993:29)).
In Nepal the belief was widespread that the government of
India held the key to the problem, since it has a guiding hand on Bhutan's
foreign relations and was moreover the country of first refuge for those who
fled from southern Bhutan. However, India insisted, and despite the changed
circumstances of early 1996 (see below), continues to insist, that the matter is
a purely bilateral issue and that it has no role to play in solving it. The
various exile associations have also argued, though to little avail, that the
camp residents themselves should be represented at the negotiating table,
because they fear that the two governments might arrive at a solution based on
mutual political expediency.
At the time of writing, no talks had taken place since the
sixth round in Thimphu between April 17-20 1995. This achieved little more than
the exchange of the names of the people who would form the joint verification
team, which would at some stage go into the camps and begin to classify the
people there into the various categories. The Nepalese delegation is said to
have urged the Bhutanese to accept the basic principle that Bhutan should take
back 'all the people from Bhutan', i.e. both citizens and longterm residents,
leaving behind only those persons who were citizens of other countries. The
Bhutanese blamed the failure of the talks on the Nepalese, who, they said, had
thereby introduced new conditions. No date was set for any subsequent meeting
and it was widely rumoured that the Nepalese team believed the bilateral process
to have been exhausted and was preparing to consider alternative strategies. The
Bhutanese, on the other hand, claimed that a solution was still near and urged
that the talks should continue.
In June 1995 the minority government in Nepal collapsed and
it was announced that general elections would be held in November. However,
these elections were cancelled by Nepal's Supreme Court in August, and a new
government was installed. For the rest of 1995 there were no further
developments, but rumours gathered force that hope of a political settlement was
waning and that the camps would be disbanded. In fact, it is unlikely that the
government of Nepal would permit this. What is more likely is that the quantity
of bilateral and multilateral aid will diminish as hope of a settlement of the
problem recedes, and that living conditions in the camps will deteriorate as a
consequence.
The differences that had always existed between camp-based
activists and the former officials and bureaucrats who tended to operate from
Kathmandu crystallized in the creation of two new umbrella organizations: the
Bhutan Coalition for Democratic Movement (BCDM) and the Appeal Movement
Coordinating Council (AMCC). In September 1995 the AMCC submitted a lengthy
written appeal to the king of Bhutan asking for: the release of Tek Nath Rizal
and the initiation of a process of national reconciliation; the suspension and
review of the 1985 Citizenship Act; the cancellation of the 'One Nation One
People' policy; the restoration and protection by law of human rights in Bhutan;
the establishment of a new electoral system with equal representation of the
various regions of Bhutan; and the return of Bhutanese refugees who left after
April 9, 1988. It announced that if no response came from the king by January
1996 a peaceful march would be launched from the camps to Bhutan, in order to
present the appeal to the king in person. The BCDM criticized these tactics on
various grounds. Nonetheless, the first 150 marchers set out on 14 January and
were arrested by Indian police as soon as they crossed the Nepalese border on 17
January. A second group of 300 marchers attempted to enter India on 23 January,
but was obliged to stage a sit-in demonstration at the border until 14 February,
at which point 273 were allowed to cross but were also arrested. Further groups
of marchers were arriving at the India-Nepal border, entering India and courting
arrest at the time of writing, and over one thousand were on Indian soil.
The first marchers were arrested by police of the state of
West Bengal, after the imposition by the central government in New Delhi of an
emergency regulation, entitled Indian Penal Code 144, that prohibits gatherings
in certain places for specified periods. Having remained theoretically neutral
on the issue for six years, India had to adopt a stance when the marchers
entered its territory, and clearly its reaction was supportive of the Royal
Government of Bhutan. However, the marchers received widespread and very active
support from the predominantly Nepali-speaking population of northern West
Bengal. There were signs that the West Bengal government, a Left Front
administration that is customarily at odds with New Delhi, was uncomfortable
about having to implement the policy of the centre on this issue, and on 28
February 1996 the first batch of 150 marchers was released, the magistrates'
court at Siliguri in West Bengal having judged their detention to be illegal.
The second group was released shortly afterward and a camp was established on
Indian soil. There were strong concerns that by entering the Indian political
arena the marchers would gain friends from the Indian Nepali community, who
would not be the most persuasive advocates of their case if it emerged that
Indian government policy was the deciding factor. The Bhutan government fears
pan Nepali nationalism, and New Delhi also views the communist government of West
Bengal and the Indian Nepali political parties with caution. At the time of
writing it remained unclear how events would unfold, though it seemed likely
that the two governments would meet again in the spring of 1996 and it was clear
that the crisis had entered a new phase.
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