Conclusion

It must be admitted that significant differences exist between Smith's models and the realities of the Drukpa and Nepali Bhutanese ethnic identities. Also, this uncomfortably real situation differs from Smith's theoretical scenario, in that Bhutan's particular geopolitical location obliges its governing elite to conceive of itself as threatened by demographic forces. The Drukpa Bhutanese are a majority within their own country, but think of themselves as a threatened minority in the broader regional context. None the less, it can be argued that both kinds of ethnic community (the loose, 'lateral' ethnic community of the Ngalong and central Bhutanese elites in the north and the more sharply-defined 'vertical' ethnic community of the Nepali Bhutanese in the south) co-existed more or less peacefully in Bhutan until the 1980s, although almost all of the political power was vested in the former community and contact between them was limited. But the bureaucratic modernization and economic development that took place in Bhutan after 1961 began to disturb and challenge the definition of Bhutanese ethnicity among the e1ite, and after the 1970s it also brought Bhutan's several ethnic communities, which had hitherto interacted to a very minimal extent, into more regular contact. There are signs that elements within the eastern Sharchhop community had become restive because of the Ngalong/central Bhutanese monopolization of positions of authority and privilege: the formation of a Sharchhop political party opposed to the government - the Druk National Congress - was announced in Kathmandu in June 1994. The e1ites in the north realized that the 'vertical' or 'demotic' ethnicity of the Nepali Bhutanese community in the south was very different from that of the north in that it pervaded all levels of southern Bhutanese society, and also that in neighbouring areas this ethnicity had already been mobilized to bring about political change. It seemed axiomatic to the Bhutanese leadership that the populist ethnic nationalism of the Nepali Bhutanese in the south would in time be mobilized and that such a mobilization would sweep away the more exclusive 'lateral' ethnic nationalism of the Drukpa in the north. Thronson makes much the same point:

the picture is not one of a sudden realization, thirty years after the fact, that Bhutan was inhabited by a large number of illegal ethnic Nepalis, but rather a scenario of escalating concern over the failure to integrate this portion of the population into the politically dominant Drukpa culture (Thronson 1993:5).

As a result of this concern, the government of Bhutan embarked upon a programme of what Smith calls 'vernacular mobilization' in which the 'genuine membership' of the ethnic nation was to be re-educated in the "true culture, the pristine culture of their ancestors, unsullied by contact with modem civilization" (Smith 1994:192). Hence the extension of the Driglam Namzhag code of social etiquette and dress from elite and monastic circles to the general populace; the banning of TV antennae and satellite dishes; the promotion of the national language, Dzongkha; the downgrading of the status of Nepali in national life; the tightening of citizenship and marriage laws; and so on. Smith warn us that this process "can so easily end in the exclusion of other, non-national values and ultimately their bearers, lest they defile the rediscovered and regenerated original culture" and that "citizenship becomes coextensive with the membership of the dominant ethnic community" (1994:193). He points to the "tendency of ethnic nationalisms to single out and categorize minorities within as alien..." (1994:19 1). Here one is reminded of some very extreme anti-'Lhotshampa' statements made in Bhutan's National Assembly and of the proposal in the same body in 1991 that all Bhutanese (including the 'Lhotshampas') should be obligated to remake the formal pledge of loyalty (genja) to the king and the Drukpa political system that had originally been made when the monarchy was established in 1907.

To quote Smith once more, 'vernacular mobilization' (termed 'Bhutanization', first by its proponents and later by its critics) provoked resistance from the Nepali Bhutanese, who had until then remained a "quiescent and accommodated demotic ethnie"(ibid.:191). This resistance took on all the characteristics the northern elites most feared: an attempt at mass political mobilization and a search for support from Nepali-led political groups outside Bhutan. The Bhutanese government justified its response to this resistance by classifying a large portion of the southern population as non-nationals, playing up the violent aspects of its resistance and presenting it to the outside world as terrorism. Villagers in southern Bhutan continue to suffer sporadic attacks and robberies: the perpetrators of these crimes have certainly included residents of the refugee camps (as admitted in the Bhutan Review, published by the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan in exile in Kathmandu, in its first issue (January 1993)), and probably also criminal elements from across the border in India who take advantage of a situation in which villages stand empty.

Inevitably, the two sides in this argument - the exiled Nepali Bhutanese leaders thrown up by the crisis and the Drukpa elite in Thimphu - have widely differing perceptions of the problem. The exiles argue that their return must be accompanied by political reforms in Bhutan that guarantee the Nepali Bhutanese a greater say in the administration and ensure their civil and cultural rights. The government of Bhutan lays stress on the robberies in the south and the threat of 'demographic invasion'. It describes the issue as its 'southern problem' and presents it to the world as a 'threat to a nation's survival'. The situation is not adequately described by journalistic clichés such as 'clash of cultures' or 'ethnic cleansing'. It is the result of a politically dominant ethnic community seeking to defuse the potential threat of a previously marginal and subservient but very different ethnic community that exists within its own territory, but is also part of a larger cross-border grouping. This it did, in effect if not by intention, by presenting it with a choice between subscribing visibly and actively to the Drukpa ethnic and political ethos or surrendering its right to a continued presence in Bhutan.

As a result of the outflow of southern Bhutanese, the characteristics of each ethnic community have been heightened, the distance between them has become much greater, and the search for an accommodation has become much more difficult. Whenever a member of the government of Nepal states that all Bhutanese refugees should go home "with honour and dignity", what the Drukpa Bhutanese elite hears is something very different. There appears to be a will within Bhutan to develop more participative processes and institutions, but in practice the rhetoric and the reality often do not match. For instance, in 1971 the National Assembly ordained that ministers should be elected every five years, but this requirement was abolished by the same body seven years later. The fact that the demand for democracy emanates from exiled opponents of the government who are almost all Nepali Bhutanese means that the word 'democracy' has become anathema. No meeting of the National Assembly, Bhutan's main forum for political debate which has met at least once a year since it was founded in 1953, was called between July 1993 and August 1995.

It is impossible now for the Bhutanese elite to accept the return of any significant proportion of the refugees unless it can be sure that its hold on power will not be fatally weakened as a consequence. It is unlikely that the Bhutanese government does not know how many of the refugees would be entitled to repatriation if an agreement was reached on the basis of international law, and this may explain its apparent reluctance to proceed to joint verification in the camps. However, Bhutan recognizes that it is in its interests for the problem to be resolved, and one has a sense that it would probably prefer a settlement in which it took back what it considered a politically acceptable number of refugees, with the remainder being resettled elsewhere. This is a solution that would be strongly resisted by the refugee leadership, and heavily criticized in public fora in Nepal.

If all of the genuinely dispossessed are ever to return to their homes and fields in southern Bhutan, the Bhutanese government will have to adopt a more inclusive style of territorial nationalism that includes the returnees in the national fold, while respecting their ethnic distinctiveness. In cultural terms, Bhutan is fully justified in its concern to preserve the distinctive Buddhist heritage that defines it as a national entity. Bhutan is tiny and vulnerable and has the misfortune of being located in one of the most turbulent comers of the Indian sub-continent; it requires a distinctive identity and the Drukpa culture provides this. Many of the exiles recognize the fact, including a senior ex-bureaucrat:

It is for us to realize that they have as much right to protect their interests as we have a right to demand ours ...We are as concerned about people with vested interests lurking within the southern Bhutanese community as they are, but that does not mean that everyone must suffer. Our position is that if Bhutan is going to survive as a sovereign nation with its current identity and international status there has to be a system which will take into account the views of the southern Bhutanese community, because unless and until they kick out the entire southern population, which is not feasible, this problem will persist (Bhim Subba, in Hutt and Sharkey 1995).

The exclusive style of ethnic nationalism adopted by the Bhutanese government has put the future of its unique Buddhist polity in jeopardy. A recognition by the Nepali Bhutanese of Bhutan's right to cultural distinctiveness does not excuse the government from providing social, political and economic justice to the non-Drukpa elements of multi-ethnic Bhutan: "Bhutan denies the allegation of inequity. But it has not discussed the problem with its own subjects" (Das 1995:123). If this problem is to be resolved some re-evaluation is necessary of the meaning of Bhutanese nationhood and citizenship. Until such a re-evaluation occurs there will be no justice for those Bhutanese who languish in the refugee camps in Morang and Jhapa.

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THRONSON, D. B. (1993) Cultural Cleansing. A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan. Kathmandu: INHURED International.

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 - (March 1995) Briefing notes, courtesy of UNHCR Kathmandu, March 1995

 - (April 1995) Situation report on Bhutanese refugees and asylum-seekers in Nepal covering the period I January-31st March 1995.

 - (July 1995) Situation report on Bhutanese refugees and asylum-seekers in Nepal covering the period I April-30th June 1995.

 - (October 1995) Situation report on Bhutanese refugees and asylum-seekers in Nepal covering the period I July-30 September 1995.

MS received August 1995; revised MS received April 1996

Thanks must be expressed to the British Academy for funding visits to Nepal and Bhutan in August-September 1992, and to Nepal and India in February-March 1995. My thanks to the Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Bhutan for hospitality and assistance during the former visit, and to the Foreign Ministry of His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the UNHCR office in Kathmandu for their help in enabling me to visit the refugee camps during the latter. My thanks also to members of HUROB (the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan) in Kathmandu and AHURA (Association of Human Rights Activists) in Damak, Jhapa, for assistance and information, and to CARITAS Nepal in Damak for help and hospitality. The cartography was done by Claire Ivison of SOAS in London.

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